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In some medical situations, there are
clear right answers — the use of beta
blockers after a myocardial infarction or
glucose monitoring for diabetics, for exam-
ple [1,2]. In these cases, there are unam-
biguous data supporting the efficacy of the
intervention and virtual unanimity among
providers and patients that the benefits out-
weigh any potential side effects. Other
medical situations present significant un-
certainty with regard to what physicians
and their patients consider optimal therapy.
Benign prostatic hyperplasia (BHP†) is the
paradigmatic example, as there is generally
no medical reason to prefer prostatectomy,
medication, or watchful waiting, and pa-
tients will select different therapies depend-
ing on factors such as their aversion to
surgery, tolerance for discomfort, and the
importance of an active sex life [3].
The Stacey diagram (Figure 1) depicts
the decisions faced by patients and
providers by focusing on two dimensions
— the provider’s beliefs about the level of
certainty regarding the efficacy of therapy
(x-axis) and the level of consistency of pa-
tient preferences (y-axis) [4]. When there
is little agreement between patients about
what they value (e.g., reducing pain vs. ob-
taining a conclusive diagnosis vs. increas-
ing longevity at any cost) and low certainty
in the mind of the treating physician about
which treatment produces the best out-
come, there is “chaos” and little basis for
care decisions. In areas of high agreement
and high certainty, there is “order” and a
clear “right answer.” In between these ex-
tremes lies the “zone of complexity.”
When there is order on the Stacey dia-
gram, the problem of inappropriate practice
variation is easy to conceptualize. In these
situations, there is a clear right answer that
cannot be confounded by differences in pa-
tient attributes. The goal is, therefore, to
bring non-complying physicians up to
speed, such that they administer the pre-
vailing standard of care. In all other areas
of the Stacey diagram, and especially when
there is “chaos,” remedying undesirable
practice variation is not so clear-cut. Con-
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†Abbreviations: BHP, benign prostatic hyperplasia; PtDAs, patient decision aids.ventional wisdom dictates that providers
should seek to reduce only “unwarranted
variation,” the variation not explained by ill-
ness, patient preferences, or the dictates of
evidence-based medicine. For a situation in
which there is no medical justification for
choosing one course of treatment over an-
other (e.g., BPH), physicians would refrain
from influencing their patients’choices, con-
sistently presenting the information in an un-
biased and uniform manner. The goal is to
reduce the extent to which physicians’subtle
biases toward particular therapies are ex-
pressed in patients’ decisions, allowing pa-
tients to freely choose according to their
unique preferences.
AN ARGUMENT FOR PATIENT
DECISION AIDS
Evidence suggests that unwarranted
variation in the use of preference-sensitive
options can be reduced by providing patients
with decision aids. Typically, patient deci-
sion aids (PtDAs) contain outcome data for
the various options, tailored information
about the pros and cons of each choice, and
feedback from patients who have chosen
each of the options [5]. Although unbiased
PtDAs for many preference-sensitive condi-
tions result in lower costs by reducing the
invasiveness of the care, resistance from
providers has left private payers slow to pro-
vide them. Some physicians have voiced
concerns about increased time and hassle,
but the primary obstacle is the loss of in-
come that accompanies the shift to less inva-
sive treatment [6,7]. In the absence of
physician support, logistical problems pre-
vent insurers from getting decision aids to
patients early enough to have an impact
[5,8].
Given that insurers require the assis-
tance of providers to implement shared deci-
sion-making tools that have been proven to
reduce unwarranted practice variation, firms
would be well advised to share the value cre-
ated by PtDAs with physicians. As O’Con-
nor and colleagues suggest, payers should
consider reimbursing physicians for dis-
pensing PtDAs [5]. Blumenthal raises the
question of “whether paying a surgeon or a
gastroenterologist to dispense information
therapy will adequately compensate for a
25-30 percent decline in their hernia opera-
tions or colonoscopies” [7]. The answer to
this, however, is simple: If the reimburse-
ment does not sufficiently compensate the
surgeon and gastroenterologist, then the
health plan is not paying the physicians
enough. Payers should increase reimburse-
ment to a level that is sufficiently high to en-
gender provider support, but low enough so
they, too, can reap some of the savings as-
sociated with a shift to less invasive therapy.
Shared decision-making tools create value;
the only issue should be how to divvy up the
pie — not whether to bake it.
THE FUNDAMENTAL ATTRIBUTION
ERROR: AN ARGUMENT FOR
USING DECISION AIDS SKEWED
TOWARD INEXPENSIVE THERAPY
As discussed above, there is a general
consensus that practice variation due to pa-
tients’ differing subjective valuations of the
same experiences and health outcomes, as
well as their different attitudes toward time
trade-offs and risk, should not be corrected.
In other words, there is no need to reduce
“warranted variation,” which is caused by
high y-values on the Stacey diagram [9].
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Figure 1. The Stacey Diagram
Source: RMJ Bohmer, K Sepucha, and LR Feld-
man, “Shared Decision Making,” Harvard Busi-
ness School Case #9-604-001 (Rev. January 25,
2005).This logic, however, rests on the erroneous
presumptions that patients possess a set of
relatively permanent internal preferences
and that these preferences are guiding pa-
tients’ selection of treatment. The field of
social psychology has long recognized peo-
ple’s tendency to attribute human behavior
to disposition (internal preferences) when
powerful situational forces are, in fact, far
more controlling [10,11]. Dr. Lee Ross
coined the term “fundamental attribution
error” to describe this common bias [12].
The seminal demonstrations of the fun-
damental attribution error were independ-
ently conducted a decade earlier by Stanley
Milgram at Yale University, and then Ed-
ward E. Jones at Duke University. In Stanley
Milgram’s series of experiments, volunteer
subjects were falsely led to believe that they
would be administering shocks to another
volunteer when that person answered a
question incorrectly. The “other volunteer,”
however, was an actor. The subject was led
to believe that the shocks he administered
were painful and their intensity would in-
crease with each wrong answer — from 15
volts all the way up to 450 volts, which was
labeled “Danger! XXX!” on the shock box.
In the basic design of the experiment, Mil-
gram stood next to the volunteer with a
white coat and a clipboard, sternly asking
him to continue shocking the actor with each
wrong answer, but never using threats or
physical force to coerce the volunteer. In this
experimental setup, 100 percent of the sub-
jects shocked up to 350 volts and 65 percent
shocked all the way to the 450 volt maxi-
mum. Before conducting the experiment,
Milgram and his assistants predicted that
only 1 in 1,000 volunteers — “the sadists”
— would go that far.They fell subject to the
fundamental attribution error, failing to ap-
preciate the powerful, yet unseen, situational
forces controlling the volunteers’ actions.
Milgram was able to further demonstrate the
power of situational influences on behavior.
By varying the proximity of either the vol-
unteer to the actor or the experimenter to the
volunteer, or by moving the location of the
experiment from Yale to Bridgeport, Con-
necticut, Milgram discovered he could in-
crease or decrease the intensity of shock that
volunteer subjects would be willing to ad-
minister [13,14,15].
In experiments conducted by Edward E.
Jones and Victor Harris, the two psycholo-
gists hypothesized that subjects would at-
tribute the free-choice behavior of others to
internal preferences and forced behavior to
the situation. Subjects were asked to read es-
says in support of and against Fidel Castro.
Subjects were then asked to rate how posi-
tive the author’s attitude was likely to be to-
ward Castro. When the subjects were told
that the authors freely chose the position of
their essays, they rated authors who wrote in
favor of Castro as significantly more likely
to have a positive attitude toward him.
While this result was expected, Jones and
Harris were surprised to find that subjects,
who were told that the authors were assigned
a position based on a coin toss, still rated au-
thors who wrote in favor of Castro as signif-
icantly more likely to have a positive
attitude toward him. The subjects were un-
able to see the tremendous effect that the sit-
uation (i.e., being forced to write an essay
favoring a particular politician) had on the
authors [16].
These experiments are powerful exam-
ples of two related points. First, the situation
is tremendously influential insofar as exoge-
nous environmental factors can influence
humans to perform incredible actions. Sec-
ond, people tend to attribute human action
to disposition, overlooking the incredibly
powerful role of situation.This suggests that
patients do not select treatment options on
the basis of permanent, internal preferences.
Rather than unearthing deeply held beliefs,
the employment of PtDAs reveals the result
of powerful situational forces that, because
of the fundamental attribution error, are dif-
ficult to see. If an individual chooses watch-
ful waiting over surgery, it is likely due to
conscious or subconscious exogenous influ-
ences (perhaps a TV show in which the sur-
gical patient expired after post-operative
complications), rather than a stable propen-
sity toward risk-aversion. This revelation
has profound consequences for payers inter-
ested in reducing practice variation and
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patients’ values are malleable, but also that
purposefully leading a patient to elect less
invasive therapy may be completely ethical
(assuming, of course, that there is no clinical
reason — besides a patient’s values — to
choose one therapy over another). Since in-
ternal preferences carry little weight in the
decision-making process (and may, in fact,
be entirely illusory), it is reasonable to be-
lieve that the reduction in health care costs
associated with a shift to less invasive ther-
apy might outweigh the decline in utility ex-
perienced by patients who make a decision
counter to their “values.” I qualify my state-
ments with the italicized words “may” and
“might” to indicate that this point should be
subjected to empirical analysis. It may be
the case that preferences play a less impor-
tant role in choice than situational factors
but are not illusory and the decline in utility
associated with making decisions contrary
to one’s preferences outweighs any decrease
in health care costs associated with a shift to
less invasive therapy. If this were indeed the
case, then it would be unethical to purpose-
fully alter a patient’s decision.
From the standpoint of payers, war-
ranted variation is equally as problematic as
unwarranted variation; both increase health
care costs. If empirical research demon-
strates that the reduction in health care costs
associated with convincing patients (via sit-
uational pressure) to undergo less invasive
therapy outweighs any diminution in patient
utility, payers should consider designing
PtDAs that exploit the malleability of
human preferences. PtDAs could still pres-
ent patients with the benefits and drawbacks
of all therapeutic options, but might do so in
a way that makes the choice seem obvious.
For instance, survival statistics (i.e., percent-
age of people who live) could be used to de-
scribe the probable outcome of the least
invasive options, while mortality statistics
(percentage of people who die) are used for
the most invasive options [17]. By capital-
izing on humans’ natural cognitive biases
and heuristics (e.g., our implicit, automatic
tendency to favor survival statistics over
mortality statistics), biased decision aids
may be able to bring down the cost of care
without sacrificing objective quality or pa-
tients’ subjective valuations of treatment.
While we must be careful about damaging
the trust that is fundamental to the physi-
cian-patient relationship, it seems plausible
that loaded PtDAs would yield more good
than harm. Indeed, given the problems of ac-
cess created by rising insurance premiums,
twisting the truth may be the only morally
correct action.
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